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EXCHANGE CONTROL AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND-
ARTHUR NUSSBAUMt
THE monetary turmoil which has followed the last war has engen-
dered two main sets of problems in the legal field. First, the post-war
devaluations, and particularly those of last September, have raised
afresh numerous questions generally connected with devaluation. A
considerable body of cases and legal literature has long evolved in this
matter." The second line of problems relates to exchange control, that
is, broadly speaking, to governmental control of international payments
and of transactions in international media of payments (foreign ex-
change, gold). Since 1931 exchange control has spread over the world;
in our day no country is free of it.2 Although ample material, judicial
as well as doctrinal, is available on this score too,3 an unprecedented
situation arose in 1946 when the Articles of Agreement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund4 became effective.s Several of these articles
contain rules on exchange control which are novel and of considerable
interest to the lawyer.
For the purpose of the present inquiry it is necessary first to appraise
the general legal significance of the Agreement. It would be erroneous
to assume that each of the articles is binding upon American courts or
* The greater part of this article is taken from a forthcoming volume, MonEY n
THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, a rewritten edition of NUSSDAUn, M01,mY
IN THE LAW (1939).
t Visiting Research Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
1. Cf. NuSSBAum, MoNEY iN THE LAW §§ 22 and 36 (1939).
2. It has often been asserted that the United States and Switzerland have no ex-
change control That assertion is not accurate. In both countries transactions in gold are
subject to government license. For this country see Gold Reserve Act of January 31,
1934, 48 STAT. 337 § 6, 31 U.S.C. 441 (1946); 31 CODE FED. REcs., Part 54 (1949)
(Gold Regulations of the Treasury). As for Switzerland, cf. Decree of the Federal
Council of Dec. 7, 1942, EWGEN6ssisCHE GEsETZSAMMLUNG 1137 (1942).
3. NussDAUmr, MONEY IN THE LAW §§ 37-39; Bloch & Rosenberg, Current Problcns
of Freezing Control, 11 FORD. L. REv. 71 (1942); Freutel, Exchange Control, Fre-ing
Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARv. L. REv. 30 (1942).
4. UNrIED NATIONS MoNETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFFRENCE, FINAL Acr AND Rz-
LATED DocumETs (Dep't State Pub. No. 2187, Conf. Set. No. 55) (1944). Hereafter the
articles of the Agreement are cited by their numbers only.
5. The precise date is December 27, 1946, as thirty governments had declared their
accession. INTERNATIONAL AfONETARY FUND, FiRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOArD OF
GovERNo s (1946-7). Members were authorized to join until Dec. 31, 1946 with the
privileges of original members under Art. II § 2(a) of the Agreement INTERN:ATONAL
MoI=ir nY FUND, SEuscrED DocumE-xs. BOARD OF GovERNoRs INAUGURAL MEETnGr 21,
28 (1946).
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upon courts of other member countries.6 To ascertain the status of an
article, one has to look at the national enabling acts, and particularly
at the American Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945,1 the English
Bretton Woods Agreement Order 1945, together with the Order in
Council, 1946,8 and the Canadian Bretton Woods Agreement Act of
1945.9
Under Art. XX § 2(a) of the Agreement, each member's instrument
of acceptance must set forth that the government "has taken all steps
necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Agree-
ment." As regards the obligations concerning the status, immunities
and privileges of the Fund, Art. IX § 10 imposes upon the member
governments the additional duty to make the pertinent provisions of
the Agreement "effective in terms of their own law," that is, to "in-
corporate" them into their respective municipal laws. No such duty is
specifically set forth regarding the other parts of the Agreement. Gen-
erally, therefore, the governments are not bound to transform the
canons of the Agreement into their internal laws.
Of course, the Agreement is internationally binding upon the mem-
ber governments to its full extent, but the absence of the internal effect
is of considerable importance. To give an instance: the Agreement
obligates the member governments to buy or sell gold within a certain
margin only at a prescribed price. In February 1949 the dailies re-
ported that South African gold was sold above that price with the
cooperation of an English broker. The broker had not violated the
English internal law which only prohibited unlicensed importation of
gold; and such importation was not intended. The problem is high-
lighted by the language of the English and Canadian enactments: they
-state that only the provisions on status, immunities and privileges of
the Fund and Art. VIII § 2(b)(1)-to be discussed later-have "the
force of law." The English Bretton Woods Order in Council is par-
ticularly illuminative. It contains a Schedule enumerating the Agree-
ment provisions which "have the force of law"; these provisions are
only those mentioned above. That arrangement makes it perfectly
clear that the nonenumerated provisions are not the "law of the land."
They are not ipso facto binding upon individuals and, to this extent,
6. The members are at present (1949) : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatamala, Honduras,
Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Republic, Poland, Siam, Syria, Thailand,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia. Among the outsiders are Argentina, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Soviet
Union, Sweden, Spain and Switzerland.
7. 59 STAT. 512 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-286k (1946).
8. 9-10 Geo. VI., c. 19 (1945).
9. 9-10 Geo. VI., c. 11 (1945).
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must not be applied by the ordinary law courts. Similar enumerations
are found in the Bretton Woods Act of the United States. 0 Most regu-
lations of other member states 11 are not so specific and may give rise
to doubts that can be solved only on the basis of the principles pre-
vailing in each particular state regarding the internal-law effect of
international agreements. The celebrated controversy on the "monis-
tic" or "dualist" theory 12 may play a role in such inquiries though the
situation at hand is peculiar inasmuch as the Agreement itself does not
generally require the internal-law effect.
Generally speaking, the provisions of the Agreement on exchange
control are addressed to the member governments only. For instance,
Art. VIII § 2(a) enjoins the imposition of "restrictions on the making
of payments and transfers for current international transactions." This
rule is in accord with the proclaimed objectives of the Fund, which are
to "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade" [Art. I (ii) ] and to eliminate "foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade." The text of Art. VIII § 2(a)
sounds sweeping. In reality its significance is greatly limited. The
Agreement differentiates capital transfers and current transactions, a
distinction replacing the older one 13 of financial and commercial pay-
ments. Restrictions of capital transfers are not prohibited by Art.
VIII § 2(a); they are permitted without time limit. The Fund may
even request a member to introduce them in order to meet a large or
sustained outflow of capital. 14 Moreover, restrictions of current trans-
actions are permitted (or required) in two cases, namely, (a) if a cur-
rency becomes so scarce (dollars!) that the Fund will have to apportion
its supply among the members, and (b) during the transitional period.1"
The scarce-currency problem though of paramount economic in-
terest 16 does not require much discussion from a legal point of view.17
10. There the language is used that the enumerated provisions "shall have full force
and effect in the United States and its Territories and possessions." 22 U.S.C. § 286h.
The divergence from the English and Canadian enactments is verbal only.
11. They are on the whole rather scanty. Some instances are given infra notes 38 and
40. In fact many member states have not even passed formal Acts on the subject.
12. See, e.g., 1 OPPENaI' M, INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 et seq. (6th ed., Lauterpacht,
1947).
13. NussBAum, Mo,-EY IN v= LAw 510 (1939).
14. Art VI §3.
15. Arts. VII § 3 (b) and XIV § 2, both referred to in Art. VIII § 2(a).
16. See, particularly, WIU~rAus, POSTWAR MAfoNAIW PaNs LM hii (1947); Bern-
stein, Scarce Currencies and the International Monelary Fund, 53 J. POL. Eco.;. 1 (1945) ;
Beckhart, The Bretton Woods Proposals versus Alternatives in MoNv AND TnE LAw 15
(New York University School of Law ed. 1945) ; Warburton, The Tripartite Problem of
Scarce Currencies, 64 Po- Scr Q. 388 (1949).
17. Except that Art. VII sets forth a number of procedural regulations With regard
to the handling of scarce currencies. Furthermore, under Art. VIII § 6, members agree
not to invoke obligations of earlier agreements in such a manner as will prevent the opera-
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Regarding the transition period which runs five years--apparently
from March 1, 1947-members may for its duration maintain controls
over current transactions and adapt them to changing conditions; 181
those whose territories were occupied by the enemy in World War I1
may introduce new restrictions. True, according to the Agreement,
abolition of restrictions on current transactions should be taken into
consideration by the Fund and its members during the transitional
period, 19 but this vague provision has not gained practical significance
as yet. On the other hand, restrictions do not end automatically on
March 1, 1952, but members who wish to retain them have to consult
the Fund. Then if the Fund in a carefully regulated proceeding advises
against retention and the member does not comply, repressive measures
may be taken.20 Control of capital transfers, we repeat, remains
uninhibited anyhow, and requires inevitably a certain control of all
transfers in order to intercept capital transfers disguised as current
transactions. 21 It appears, therefore, that exchange control will proba-
bly persist for a long time to come-far beyond the "transitional"
period.
The borderline between "capital transfers" and "current transac-
tions" is drawn in the Agreement by defining the latter 21 and authoriz-
ing the Fund to elaborate the definition further. 23 Again the definitions
by the Agreement or by the Fund do not have the force of internal law,
that is, they are not binding in themselves upon individuals unless and
until they have been enacted into internal law. On the other hand, they
may carry weight beyond the sphere of the International Monetary
tion of restrictions imposed under Art. VII § 5, for reducing the scarcity. Does this mean
(as assumed by WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at lxxvii) that if dollars are apportioned
as "scarce currency," the United States must put up with discriminatory treatment con-
trary to previous agreements? It is true that countries short of dollars have to cut down
imports from the United States. Still this consequence, apparently envisaged by Williams,
can hardly be considered discriminatory in a legal sense. Cf. 1 GENEVA GENERAL AGrE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (United Nations Publications; Dep't State Pub. No.
3107, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 111) Part II, Art. III (1947).
18. Art. IX §§ 2-5. As to the beginning of the transitional period, see Art. XIV § 4,
and INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL 1?EPoRT 1947, p. 70, but, the question
seems not to be definitely settled as yet.
19. Art. XIV § 2.
20. Art. XIV § 4.
21. This has been acknowledged, with evident reluctance, by Art. VI § 3.
22. Art. XIX(i). "Payments for current transactions means payments which are
not for the purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation: (i) All pay-
ments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and
normal short-term banking and credit facilities; (ii) Payments due as interest on loans
and as net income from other investments; (iii) Payments of moderate amount for amor-
tization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments; (iv) Moderate remittances for
family living expenses."
23. Art. XIX (i) par. 2.
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Fund as the distinction between current transactions and capital trans-
fers is employed elsewhere also, for instance, in Treasury rulings under
the American Freezing Order of 1940.24
The innate contradiction between the proclaimed objective of the
Fund-elimination of exchange control-and its actual result-pres-
ervation of exchange control-is accentuated by the fact that in two
important relations the Agreement makes provision for strengthening
exchange control (in itself purely a matter of domestic law) by giving
it international effect. Art. VIII § 2(b) second sentence, encourages
members to "co-operate, by mutual accord in measures for the purpose
of making the exchange control regulations of either member more
effective. . . ." Thus the Agreement favors special exchange control
arrangements, bipartite or multipartite, among members. This author-
ization has been used on a large scale for conventions saving the actual
transfer of gold or money by way of elaborate set-off (clearing) pro-
cedures. The Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compen-
sations, concluded on October 16, 1948, under the Marshall Plan be-
tween eighteen European governments, is the main instance. -2 5
The other provision in point forms the legally most interesting part
of the Agreement. It is the first sentence of Art. VIII § 2(b), which
reads as follows:
"Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agree-
ment, shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member."
The rule can be traced back to a suggestion of the Keynes Plan that
"inward movements not approved by the countries from which they
originate" should be "deterred" abroad by appropriate means. = The
English were therefore leaders in the process of drafting. The original
draft read that "exchange transactions in the territory of one member
involving the currency of any other member, which evade or avoid the
exchange regulations prescribed by that other member and authorized
by this Agreement, shall not be enforceable in the territory of any
24. Exec. Order No. 8389, as amended, 12 FEn. REG. 2249 (1947), and RnE. SE'eY
T EAs. 53 (1941). The distinction appears also in the ANGLo-Aurnxcsur FI-NAICIAL
AGREEMENT OF 1945, 8ii (Dep't State Pub. No. 2439, Comm. Policy Ser. No. E0), and in
the EcoNoMc AGREEMENT BErwmaa His MAIEsr 's GoVRNUENT IN THE UNITED Kn.X-
DOM AND THE AnGENnNE GovRNxsmxEr passim. (Cmd. 6953, 1946).
25. The lengthy and highly complicated text of the Agreement is set out, together
with a lucid comment in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 19TH AnuAL RFror
200-258 (1949).
26. 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DocuMENTs OF Trn UxrraD NATiois MONETARY AND FrNAN-
Cr.AL CONFERENCE (Dep't State Pub. No. 2866, Int. Org. and Conf. Ser. Nos. 1, 3) 1536
etseq. (1944).
1950]
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member." 2 A proposal to make such transactions an "offense" outside
the country of the currency involved, failed in Committee. 2 An at-
tempt to confine the provision to violations of the par value rule was
likewise unsuccessful. 29 The final text evolved from the Drafting Com-
mittee 10 with no indication of the reasons for the changes made.
The whole § 2 of Art. VIII now bears the caption "Avoidance of
Restrictions on Current Payments." This reads as if the rule under
discussion [§ 2(b) ] should be confined to "current" payments. How-
ever, it would be preposterous to impart a greater international effect
to restrictions on current transactions than to those on capital trans-
fers. Evidently, the caption tallies only with Art. VIII § 2(a). 1 The
inaccuracy is probably irrelevant legally, but it does not evoke much
confidence in the accuracy of the draft.
We turn now to an examination of the text of § 2(b).
Already the first words, "exchange contracts," confront us with a
grave problem. That phrase is by no means self-explanatory.32 "Ex-
change transactions" is more familiar and is used repeatedly elsewhere
in the Agreement. 3 As was seen, § 2(b) was originally drafted in terms
of "exchange transactions." Obviously "exchange contract" was sup-
posed to have a narrower significance. This gives at least some hint at
interpretation. Exchange transactions are generally understood to
mean transactions which have as their immediate object "exchange,"
that is, international media of payment.34 The meaning of "exchange
contracts" cannot be broader. However, national enactments on ex-
change control often invalidate unlicensed contracts not directly con-
cerned with international media of payment, such as unlicensed con-
tracts for sale of foreign securities, or contracts for import or export
particularly where the price is determined in foreign currency. Total-
itarian governments-and one has to remember that Poland and
Czechoslovakia are members of the Fund-will go to great lengths to
extend their control.35 It cannot be the meaning of the Agreement that
27. lid. at 54-5.
28. 1 id. at 334, 341, 502.
29. 1 id. at 543, 576.
30. 1 id. at 808, 625.
31. Page 423 supra.
32. It is subject to the Fund's interpretation according to Art. XVIII of the Agree-
ment, but only in a controversy between a member of the Fund and the Fund or between
members; the Fund's power does not extend to private litigation in ordinary law courtg.
The question was touched upon, but not decided, in Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd. [19481
1 All E.R. 811, 819 (C.A.), aff'd, [1949] 1 All E.R. 621 (H.L.).
33. Art. IV §§ 3 and 4(b); Art. XI § 2.
34. See, e.g., U. S. Treaty of Commerce of 1937 with Siam, 192 LxAoU or NATIONS,
TRATY SEuS 247, Art. III, par. 6 (1938), and Trade Agreement of 1939 with Turkey,
202 id. 129, Art. 8 (1940).
35. It so happens that the few recorded cases in print are all concerned with Czecho-
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the other member countries have to carry out such policies. The
criteria of "exchange contract" must be gathered from the Agree-
ment itself. The latter is exclusively concerned with the handling of
international media of payment as such. Therefore, contracts involving
securities or merchandise cannot be considered as exchange contracts
except where they are monetary transactions in disguise. And save for
this exception, even if invalid under the law of the "country of the
currency," other countries are not compelled to hold them unenforce-
able.
This approach is corroborated by another line of argument. Sec-
tion 2(b) (1) envisages "exchange control regulations . . . maintained
or imposed consistently with this Agreement." As to "maintained,"
Art. XIV § 2 explains that "members may . . . maintain . . . re-
strictions on payments and transfers for current international transac-
tions" during the transitional period (restrictions on capital payments
it was seen are permissible anyway). Consequently, Art. VIII § 2(b)(1)
applies to regulations decreed and contracts made thereunder prior to
the establishment of the Fund. In other words, the rule has retroactive
effect. This extraordinary feature in itself suggests vigilance in its
application. It cannot be presumed that all of the exchange control
regulations of the members are "consistent" with the Agreement.
Significantly, in some of the cases mentioned,"0 the Czechoslovakian
regulations had been imposed in part by the Hitler regime after the
conquest of Czechoslovakia. The fact that the Fund has not disap-
proved an exchange regulation, proves nothing as the Fund has not
entered into such an examination. In other words: Art. VIII § 2(b)(1)
should apply only where the party interested in the invalidation car
prove the consistency of the regulation invoked with the letter and
spirit of the Agreement.
The situation is complicated by the fact that Art. VIII § 2(b)(1)
contemplates only exchange regulations of that member wlwse currency
is involved. Here again an inaccuracy seems to have occurred. To give
an instance, French control regulations would come under the rule
only if French francs are involved. But the draftsmen of the Agreement
should have envisaged rather French transactions in non-French, say
English currency. Of course, if English pounds are bought in France,
slovaldan exchange control. See Frank-man v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, [1948] 2
All E.R. 1025 (CA.) ; Kraus v. Zivnostenska Bank, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S2d 203 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), and Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, SO N.Y.S2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1943); cf.
Werfel v. Zivnostenska Bank, 260 App. Div. 747, 23 N.Y.S2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1940),
re-'d, 287 N.Y. 91, 38 N.E.2d 382 (1941), analyzed by Dommr, TRADING wrra TnE Es-un
ix WoRLD WAR Il 316 (1943) from the angle of wsar emergency law. [The Frankiman
decision has now been reversed by a highly questionable judgment in [1949] 2 All .R.
671 (H.L.) ].
36. In the Frankinan and Werfel cases, supra note 35.
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francs may be involved as the purchase price. Thus, after all, French
regulations would come in. But they remain outside the scope of
§ 2(b)(1) if pounds are exchanged in Paris, say for lire. This result
does not make much sense. An attempt to explore the latter hypothesis
in detail may lead into inscrutable bramble woods. Returning instead
to the simple sale of pounds for French francs, French exchange con-
trol law, we found, has to be given effect. But what about English ex-
change control which is likewise involved? Suppose a Dutch court is
confronted with the contract. In that case Dutch private international
law will decide which legal system is applicable. If the contract was
made in Paris, French law will probably govern, so as to eliminate
English law, including English exchange control law. The example
reveals the practical significance of § 2(b)(1): Dutch Courts-pro-
vided they consider French law applicable-are barred from pre-
cluding, for reasons of Dutch public policy, the application of French
exchange control regulations. Generally speaking, invalidation of
"exchange contracts" under the law of the "country of the currency"
must be recognized by member states regardless of their own "public
policies." 3,a Still, English and, to a lesser degree, American courts are
reluctant to invoke "public policy" as a means of eliminating an un-
desirable foreign exchange-control law. Instead, they decline applica-
tion of the foreign exchange-control law on the ground that the "place
of payment" is outside the exchange-control country, or through a
strained interpretation of contractual or statutory provisions.3" The
question is whether the Agreement compels unenforceability where
according to the conflict rules of the forum the law of the country of
the currency is out of the picture.
Thus Private International Law rises its mysterious head behind
the Agreement. To the various puzzle games so significant in the
theory of Private International Law, the Agreement has added another.
The United States, England, Canada, the Philippine Republic and
Costa Rica have in their enabling Acts 11 explicitly conferred the
quality of internal law upon Art. VIII § 2(b)(1). Evidently, it is the
theory of the governments of these countries that without such action
36a. The same opinion has quite recently been expressed by the Fund, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1949, p. 83. This report became generally known only after the present article had
gone to press.
37. See the writer's article, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of
Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1037 (1940). In recent decisions the trend indicated in the
article has become even more marked. Cf. South-American Petroleum Corp. v. Colom-
bian Petroleum Co., 177 Misc. 756, 31 N.Y.S2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Boissevain v. Well,
(1949] 1 K.B. 482 (C.A.) ; Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, 11948] 2 All E.R.
1025 (C.A.) ; Graumann v. Treitel, [1940] 2 All E.R. 188 (K.B.).
38. References, supra notes 7-9. See furthermore Bretton Woods Agreements Act
of the Philippine Republic of Oct. 15, 1945, Commonwealth Act No. 699, § 11 ; and Costa
Rica Act of Dec. 24, 1945, No. 55, § 8.
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the provision would be devoid of any actual effect and, therefore, that
its "incorporation" is obligatory under the general rule of Art. XX
§ 2(a).39 That opinion seems to be fully justified, as otherwise Art. VIII
§ 2(b) (1) would be a thing of nought. Its incorporation is necessary to
"carry out" the obligations imposed upon the Government by the
Agreement. This theory leads to a far-reaching conclusion regarding
those countries which have failed to give Art. VIII § 2(b) (1) the force
of internal law. Exchange regulations of the latter countries, it appears,
are not "consistent" with the Agreement. Consequently, contract
invalidation resulting from such regulations (the French, for in-
stance 40), does not fall under Art. VIII § 2(b)(1). To this extent the-
conflict norms of each member country will decide the question of
enforceability or nonenforceability of the contract involved. In other
words: the "consistency" requirement implies a reciprocity rule which
is certainly appropriate to the situation.
Perhaps the most important point in the analysis of Art. VIII
§ 2(b) is that it provides only for international unenforceability of
contracts void under foreign law. It does not impose upon the member
states any obligation to give active assistance to the exercise of that
control. A proposal to create such an obligation was defeated at
Bretton Woods. 41 Hence Art. VIII § 2(b) does not prescribe recogni-
tion of all of the manifold effects which the exercise of national ex-
change control may have beyond the frontiers. This is especially true
of the refusal of exchange authorities to grant the license necessary to,
the performance of an otherwise valid contract. -2 Such contracts may
be enforced elsewhere.
All considered, it appears that the statement of an English court
that "The Bretton Woods Agreement shows that such restrictions
[namely, exchange restrictions of member states generally] are honored
by the members of the International Monetary Fund" 43 is far too
broad. The line which the courts will actually follow is not yet visible,
but one may doubt whether Art. VIII § 2(b) will assume any major
39. Page 422 supra. Again, the same view has been announced by the Fund. Note
36a supra.
40. The French Acts of Dec. 26, 1945, Journal Officiel of Dec. 27, 1945, p. 8590, does
not refer, directly or indirectly, to Art. VIII § 2(b) (1).
41. 1 PRocEEDINGS AND DoctrmiN-s or Tm UmrrED NATIoNs MoNETARY AND Fmu-
cA.L CoNFEREcE, supra note 26, at 502, 543, 576.
42. This and other points were overlooked in the Franknan, and the Krous cases,
supra note 35.
43. In Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, [1948] 1 All ER. 337, 342 (L.B.),
rev. [1948] 2 All E.R. 1025 (CA.) now restored by the House of Lords, note 35 'upra.
Lord Simonds observed in his opinion that the Czechoslovakian Act did not appear to
differ materially "from the legislation contemplated by the Bretton Woods Agreement
which is now part of the laws of this country." This statement apparently fails to recog-
nize an obligation toward Czechoslovakia. The other opinions do not mention the
agreement.
1950]
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importance in legal practice. 44 From a broader point of view, Art. VIII
§ 2b, remains remarkable as the strongest manifestation of the sway
held by the pro-exchange-control forces in the drafting of the Fund
Agreement. More than any other provision, it illustrates the fact that
the Agreement, which represents itself as an instrument of economic
freedom, is actually designed as a machinery for economic compulsion.
44. In Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948), the
court, disregarding Czechoslovakian exchange control regulations as foreign "revenue"
law, refused to pass on the impact of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
